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INTRODUCTION
The application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct
has been a controversial topic1 since the enactment of the Sherman AntiTrust Act in 1890 (“Sherman Act”).2 One of the central difficulties in
applying U.S. antitrust laws lies in the increasingly interrelated nature of
markets.3 Thus, in order to protect the U.S. marketplace from the harmful
effects of global cartels and deter the formation of those cartels, it is
necessary to apply U.S. antitrust laws to at least some anticompetitive
conduct occurring abroad.4 On the other hand, the application of U.S. laws
1. See Lily Henning, Antitrust Goes Global: D.C. Circuit Opens the Door to Foreign
Victims of Vitamin Price Fixing, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at 1 (commenting that there is
“often heated debate over how to interpret the scope of U.S. antitrust laws and their
application to foreign conduct”). See generally C. DOUGLAS FLOYD & E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN, PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS: THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF CIVIL ANTITRUST
LITIGATION § 1.1.4 (1996) (discussing the development of litigation under the Sherman Act
and concluding that the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws is limited “as a
practical matter” due to its controversial nature).
2. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
3. See Kenneth S. Reinker, Recent Development, Case Comment: Roche v.
Empagran, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 297, 303-04 (2004) (observing that conspiracies to
engage in anticompetitive conduct, such as price-fixing, usually involve global cartels that
simultaneously affect the economies of many nations). See generally ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., World Trade, in OECD MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 25, 25 (2005),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/20/358279
00.pdf (indicating that the volume of world trade is constantly increasing from year to year).
For example, the volume of world trade in goods and services for 2001 was $1972.3 billion,
that amount increased to $2312.7 in 2004, and further increased to $2447.8 by the second
quarter of 2005. Id.
4. See FLOYD & SULLIVAN, supra note 1, § 1.1.4 (identifying three situations which
lead to the extraterritorial application of antitrust laws). These three situations are:
(1) activities of foreign firms within the United States which have an effect in this
country, (2) activities of foreign firms outside United States boundaries which have
an adverse effect on the United States economy, and (3) activities of United States
firms located outside of the country which have adverse effects on the economy of
the United States.
Id. (quoting E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND
PROCEDURE 75-161 (3d ed. 1994)). Cases involving the application of U.S. antitrust laws
beyond U.S. borders to reach foreign anticompetitive conduct are referred to as
“extraterritorial antitrust cases” throughout this Comment.
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abroad must not be so sweeping that it interferes with the sovereignty of
other nations.5 Jurisprudence in this area of law, therefore, may be
characterized as a constant struggle to balance the United States’ interest in
protecting its own market against the interests of foreign nations in
regulating their own markets.6
Performing this balancing act is increasingly difficult as the United
States is also interested in ensuring that the court system is not
overburdened by frivolous litigation.7 This goal is difficult to achieve
because foreign plaintiffs prefer to bring suits in the United States where
they have the opportunity to recover treble damages, as opposed to
bringing suits in their home countries where such remedies are not an
5. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States calls for a
limited exercise of jurisdiction when the individual or the conduct is connected to another
state and the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) (1987). This consideration for
the laws of foreign sovereign nations is referred to as “international comity.” See Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (establishing that “comity” is “neither a matter of
absolute obligation” nor “of mere courtesy and goodwill”). The Court defined “comity” as
“the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation.” Id. at 164. The 1995 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines
reflect support by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission for
the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, while observing the concept of
international comity in the exercise of the agencies’ prosecutorial discretion. U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS
§
3.2
(1995),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/internat.htm. The guidelines list eight factors
that should be considered when making enforcement decisions:
(1) the relative significance to the alleged violation of conduct within the United
States, as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers, markets, or
exporters;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the
United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by
the action;
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic policies;
(7) the extent to which the enforcement activities of another country with respect to
the same persons, including remedies resulting from those activities, may be
affected; and
(8) the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement
action.
Id.
6. See Susan E. Burnett, Comment, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran v. F.
Hoffman-LaRoche? Conflicts of Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial
Antitrust, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 555, 559-60 (2004) (explaining the constant tension
between two U.S. policy objectives:
protecting the U.S. market from foreign
anticompetitive activity on the one hand, and respecting the laws of other sovereign nations
on the other hand).
7. See Deborah J. Buswell, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: A Three Ring
Circus—Three Circuits, Three Interpretations, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 997 (2003) (arguing
that restricting the reach of U.S. antitrust laws would result in decreasing procedural costs
and lessening the docket load for U.S. courts).
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option.8 Although expanding the jurisdictional reach of federal courts may
deter cartels from forming by instilling the fear of unlimited civil liability
upon potential violators,9 many commentators have warned that such an
expansion would only serve to open the floodgates to a sea of potential
foreign plaintiffs and overburden the U.S. court system.10
The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A.11 addressed these issues when it settled a circuit split over
the question of what jurisdictional threshold a foreign plaintiff must meet in
order to sue in a U.S. federal court to recover for injuries suffered outside
the United States due to an antitrust violation.12 The Court in Empagran
decided to restrict the jurisdictional reach of federal courts,13 creating an
“independent effects” test where courts may not assert jurisdiction over
claims alleging an injury due to foreign anticompetitive conduct when that
conduct is independent of any adverse domestic effects on the United
States.14 This holding left open the question of how courts should
determine whether a sufficient link exists between adverse effects to the
U.S. marketplace and the alleged foreign harm to demonstrate

8. See Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of
Justice, Perspectives on International Antitrust Enforcement: Recent Legal Developments
and Policy Implications, Address Before the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust
Law Fall Forum 2 (Nov. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Delrahim Speech], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/201509.pdf (stating that, although a growing
number of countries have developed their antitrust laws, the “unexpected consequence” of
this worldwide interest in pursuing antitrust violations has been an increase in foreign
parties pursuing treble damage remedies in U.S. federal courts).
9. See Joseph P. Bauer, Multiple Enforcers and Multiple Remedies: Reflections on the
Manifold Means of Enforcing the Antitrust Laws: Too Much, Too Little, or Just Right?, 16
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 303, 310 (2004) (arguing that treble damages are an incentive for
domestic and foreign plaintiffs to come forward, enhancing the deterrent component of U.S.
antitrust laws). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW MONOGRAPH 13,
TREBLE-DAMAGES REMEDY 16-18 (1986), (explaining that, while the purpose behind treble
damages is not entirely clear based on available historical materials, the remedy serves both
as a penalty for violators and an incentive for persons or corporations to sue).
10. See, e.g., SPENCER WEBER WALLER & JEFFREY L. KESSLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 5:15 (2004) (observing that balancing foreign and national
interests imposes a “heavy burden” on federal judges, who, in large part, do not have a
background in international law); see also Thomas Köster & H. Harrison Wheeler,
Appellate Courts Split on the Interpretation of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements
Act: Should the Floodgates be Opened?, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 717, 727 (2004)
(rejecting counter-arguments that legal requirements such as standing, personal jurisdiction
and forum non conveniens are sufficient to undercut the “floodgates” argument).
11. 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (Empagran).
12. See id. at 160-61 (stating that the Court granted certiorari to resolve a split between
the Fifth and Second Circuits); see also discussion infra Part I.C (discussing the split in the
circuits on the question of what constitutes a showing by the plaintiff that a domestic effect
gave rise to “a claim” under the FTAIA).
13. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 168-70 (excluding from the jurisdiction of federal courts
all foreign injury cases that are independent of any adverse anticompetitive conduct in the
United States).
14. Id. at 168-69.
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dependency.15 For example, suppose there are only five oil refineries in the
world and four of them conspire to inflate the price of crude oil to $300 per
barrel. Suppose further that there are only four companies in the world that
own barges that are able to transport oil. The four oil companies agree to
share part of their profits with those four oil transportation barge companies
as long as the barge companies promise to stop serving a Venezuelan
competitor refinery. The Venezuelan corporation could then sue in a U.S.
court, claiming that its foreign injury arose from a global scheme that
would not have survived if the oil refineries had not succeeded in imposing
inflated prices in the United States, among other major world markets, and
had not created a market allocation scheme that put it out of business.
Thus, the inflated prices in the United States helped bring about the foreign
injury because a global scheme must impose inflated prices and produce
market allocation in all major markets to survive.16 In order to create a
clear standard that would prevent companies from bringing a suit of this
nature in U.S. courts, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit clarified that the plaintiff was required to show that its injury was
proximately caused by the adverse effects of the defendants’
anticompetitive conduct on U.S. commerce.17 The claim described above
alone would not survive proximate causation. Instead, the Venezuelan
company would have to show that the higher prices it paid were directly
linked to higher prices affecting the U.S. marketplace.18 For example, if the
Venezuelan company’s largest customer was a U.S. company, then the
Venezuelan company could sue on the basis that it lost profits as a result of
lost market share in the United States; this was the result of anticompetitive
effects in the United States because consumers lost the benefit of buying
the Venezuelan oil, which was previously sold at lower prices due to lower
transportation costs.
This Comment will evaluate the probable effects of using the D.C.
Circuit’s proximate cause standard in extraterritorial antitrust cases in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Empagran. The analysis will center on
considerations of deterrence, comity, and judicial efficiency. It will argue
15. See id. at 175 (remanding the case to the D.C. Circuit to decide whether a “but for”
causation is sufficient to establish that the foreign harm is dependent upon U.S.
anticompetitive conduct).
16. This example mirrors Empagran’s alternative argument that its foreign injury was
dependent on a price-fixing conspiracy’s effects on the U.S. domestic market. See
discussion infra Part II, for an in-depth analysis of that alternate theory.
17. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (rejecting the “worldwide” effect argument that the maintenance of a global pricefixing scheme necessarily requires prices to be artificially inflated in all countries, including
the United States, because it is insufficient to establish proximate cause).
18. See id. at 1272 (clarifying that to establish proximate causation, the plaintiff must
show there was a direct connection between U.S. prices and the prices the plaintiffs paid for
the good or service that is the subject of the complaint).
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that, although this restrictive interpretation of the Supreme Court’s
guidelines may decrease the overall deterrent effect of U.S. antitrust laws in
the world at large, it correctly reflects the Supreme Court’s express
directives to give due deference to the interests of foreign nations by
preventing marginal claims from being litigated in U.S. federal courts, a
situation that Congress never intended. Other circuit courts should
therefore follow the D.C. Circuit’s lead and impose the proximate cause
requirement in cases of extraterritorial antitrust.
Part I of this Comment will examine the development of jurisdictional
approaches to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws from the
enactment of the Sherman Act to the circuit split that eventually led to the
Empagran decision. Part II will provide an analysis of the Supreme
Court’s restriction of the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act in
Empagran and the D.C. Circuit’s further restrictions through the imposition
of the proximate cause standard. Part III will examine the effects of
imposing proximate causation on the Court’s independent effects test and it
will conclude that other courts should impose this standard because it
ensures greater deference to sovereign nations, as intended by Congress,
and limits foreign plaintiffs’ access to U.S. courts as a forum for the
adjudication of marginal claims.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Early Extraterritorial Antitrust Cases: The Supreme Court
Expands the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
Congress enacted the Sherman Act as a means to condemn
monopolization and other trade restraints that “injuriously affect” the
United States.19 Thus, section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce, among the several states, or with foreign
nations . . . .”20 The legislative history of the Sherman Act includes little
discussion of the application of the Act to foreign trade, indicating that
Congress intended the Sherman Act to focus primarily on regulating
domestic commerce.21
Congress was particularly concerned with
19. See 21 CONG. REC. 2454, 2456 (1890)(statement of Sen. Sherman) (stating that one
of the purposes of the Act was to create a federal cause of action to redress anticompetitive
harms). See generally Andrew Stanger, Note, Analyzing U.S. Antitrust Jurisdiction over
Foreign Parties After Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 2003 BYU L. REV.
1453, 1456-57 (observing that the Supreme Court later “shaped the broad language of [U.S.
antitrust statutes] into well-defined categories of illegal antitrust activity, the most common
of which are monopolies, cartels, tying arrangements, and vertical price fixing”).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
21. Note, A Most Private Remedy: Foreign Party Suits and the U.S. Antitrust Laws,
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protecting U.S. commerce from “evils resulting directly to consumers.”22
As the original Sherman Act did not give individuals standing to sue
wrongdoers, Congress enacted the Clayton Act of 1914 (“Clayton Act”)23
to provide that “[w]henever the United States is hereafter injured in its
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws it
may sue therefor in the United States district court. . . .”24 One of the most
important provisions of the Clayton Act established the remedies available
to successful complainants: injunctive relief or treble damages plus costs
and attorney’s fees.25
The Sherman Act’s history reflects a steady movement towards
expanding the jurisdiction of federal courts up to the recent Empagran
decision.26 Still, when deciding questions of subject matter jurisdiction in
cases involving foreign anticompetitive conduct, courts have generally
presumed that “Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption
against extraterritoriality.”27 Underlying this view is the notion that the
United States cannot impose its laws on other sovereign nations.28 Thus,
the Supreme Court initially weighed considerations of international comity
above concerns regarding the ability of U.S. antitrust laws to deter foreign
anticompetitive activity that could harm domestic markets.29 This
114 HARV. L. REV. 2122, 2127 (2001) (concluding that Congress intended the Sherman
Act’s reference to “foreign nations” to mean foreign restraints on U.S. commerce; that is,
the Act is only concerned with restrictions on foreign trade to the extent that such
restrictions have an impact in the United States). Senator James George of Mississippi
made one of the few comments on the application of the Sherman Act to acts occurring
outside the United States. See 21 CONG. REC. 1753, 1766 (1890) (statement of Sen. George)
(questioning what should be done in a situation where foreign or domestic conspirators enter
foreign territory in order to engage in their illegal activities and evade U.S. laws).
22. 21 CONG. REC. 2551, 2558 (1890) (statement of Sen. Pugh).
23. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. § 15a (2000)). See generally Jaafar A. Riazi, Note and Comment,
Finding Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Antitrust Claims of Extraterritorial Origin:
Whether the Seventh Circuit’s Approach Properly Balances Policies of International Comity
and Deterrence, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1277, 1280-81 (2005) (outlining the history of the
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act).
24. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(a) (2000)).
25. Id.
26. See WALLER & KESSLER, supra note 10, § 5:3 (noting that the evolution toward
expansion of jurisdiction also led to a “similar evolution towards legal uncertainty”).
27. Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 428 (5th Cir.
2001) (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (explaining that
“unless there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed, [courts] must
presume [that legislation] is primarily concerned with domestic conditions”).
28. The Supreme Court initially confined jurisdiction to hear Sherman Act claims
solely to conduct occurring within United States territory. See Am. Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1909) (refusing to apply the Sherman Act to an American
corporation accused of buying out competitors and instigating the Costa Rican government
to seize plaintiff’s property to drive it out of business). The Court stated that “the general
and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.” Id. at 356.
29. See Burnett, supra note 6, at 569 (commenting that American Banana had the effect
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restrictive approach to jurisdiction, however, survived only for a brief
period of time before the Supreme Court began expanding the applicability
of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign anticompetitive conduct.30
B. Congress Enacted the FTAIA as a Means to Restrict the Jurisdictional
Reach of the Sherman Act
In response to courts that were arriving at different formulations for
assessing the reach of the Sherman Act,31 Congress enacted the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (“FTAIA”),32 a jurisdictional statute
designed to ensure that the antitrust laws would be applied “uniformly
throughout the federal judicial system.”33 Congress fashioned the FTAIA
after the Alcoa effects test,34 which Judge Learned Hand devised in 1954.35
The Alcoa test established that courts could exercise jurisdiction over
claims against violators who intended the anticompetitive activities they
of making U.S. markets “exceedingly vulnerable because the United States was unable to
independently protect its domestic commerce from harmful effects created by conduct
occurring in foreign territory”).
30. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (holding that
conduct occurring partly in the United States and affecting U.S. commerce could form the
basis of an antitrust suit in U.S. federal courts). The Court distinguished Sisal from
American Banana on the grounds that the defendants’ conduct in Sisal was “intended to
restrain trade . . . and to increase the market price within the United States.” Id. (emphasis
added). In Sisal, U.S. banks entered into contracts and conspiracies while in the United
States and established a monopoly so that Sisal Corp. was the only sisal importer in the
United States and the Comision Exportadora de Yucatan was the only purchaser of sisal
from producers. Id. at 273. Although the Mexican government aided the monopoly by
passing favorable laws at the insistence of the conspirators, the Court held that federal
courts could assert jurisdiction in this case because the conspiracy “brought about forbidden
results within the United States.” Id. at 276.
31. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490
(noting that, due to disparate judicial interpretations of the Alcoa effects test, it was
necessary to clarify the judicial standards for determining jurisdiction). For further details
on the Alcoa effects test, see notes 35-36 infra.
32. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2000).
According to the FTAIA, the Sherman Act applies to conduct involving commerce with
foreign nations if:
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect-(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or
on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged
in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of [the Sherman Act].
Id.
33. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2491; see id. at 5,
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490 (noting that one of the purposes behind the
FTAIA is to clarify ambiguity about the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law).
34. See id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2490-91 (discussing the
various interpretations of the Alcoa test, which led to the enactment of the FTAIA).
35. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945)
(holding as illegal a quota system for the export of aluminum to the United States, devised
by European companies, in order to sustain a price-fixing monopoly held by an American
company).
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undertook abroad to produce effects in the United States, and that the
anticompetitive conduct did in fact produce those effects.36
The FTAIA begins by removing from the reach of the Sherman Act all
conduct “involving trade or commerce” that is not “import trade or import
commerce” (i.e., export activity or wholly foreign activity).37 The statute
then carves back in a “domestic injury exception,” allowing the Sherman
Act to reach non-import conduct if the conduct has a “direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce or on U.S.
export trade38 and this effect “gives rise to a claim” under the Sherman
Act.39 Congress intended the FTAIA to protect U.S. exporters who could
36. Id. at 443-44. The Alcoa test expanded the jurisdictional reach of federal courts,
reflecting a growing concern for protecting domestic commerce from foreign
anticompetitive conduct. See Burnett, supra note 6, at 571 (mentioning that Alcoa was a
means to correct “market failures” shielded by national borders that would otherwise have
prevailed and created injuries beyond the jurisdictional reach of federal courts). The Alcoa
court thus rejected the American Banana approach of looking to where the conduct occurred
and, instead, decided to base Sherman Act coverage on whether the effects of
anticompetitive conduct—regardless of where the conduct occurred—were felt in the United
States. 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 272c (2d ed.
2000). Although Judge Learned Hand, who authored the Alcoa decision, made reference to
taking into account the boundaries imposed by international law, the opinion mainly placed
notions of comity on a backburner. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443 (providing only one
statement regarding the deference to other nations, where Judge Learned Hand warned that
courts “should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for
conduct which has no consequences within the United States”). Later, the Ninth Circuit
added a gloss to the Alcoa effects test, creating a balancing test that required courts to weigh
whether foreign interests dominated the domestic interest when determining the propriety of
asserting jurisdiction over the matter. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 549
F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1977). This test proved “unmanageable” as evidenced by the fact
that it took a decade of litigation to resolve that case. See United Phosphorous, Ltd. v.
Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 957 (7th Cir. 2003) (using the Timberlane case as an
example of how a fact-intensive jurisdictional test may create adjudication problems in
antitrust cases).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 6a; see Stanger, supra note 19, at 1462 (emphasizing that the Sherman
Act applies “in full force” to all import trade or import commerce, so that any individual or
corporation that “imports goods or services into the United States—whether domestic or
foreign—is subject to the Sherman Act”).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1); see H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 7-8, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2492-93 (clarifying that the reach of the Sherman Act is not limited to
import trade or import commerce where non-import activity affects commerce within the
United States or unfairly disadvantages U.S. exporters). The “substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect” requirement is not new, having been used previously in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)(a) (1987) (stating that whether
exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable depends on “the extent to which the activity takes place
within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the
territory”).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 6a. Conflicting interpretations with regard to this second prong of the
FTAIA’s test eventually led to a circuit split. Compare Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v.
Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 429 (5th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the meaning of the FTAIA
language mandating that the effect of the anticompetitive conduct “giv[e] rise” to a claim as
requiring a showing by the foreign plaintiff that its “injuries [arose] from the
anticompetitive conduct on a United States market”), with Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l P.L.C.,
284 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that “[t]he ‘effect’ on domestic commerce need
not be the basis of for a plaintiff’s injury, it only must violate the substantive provisions of
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show that U.S. antitrust laws hindered their business activities.40 By
restricting the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act, the FTAIA exempts
both American exporters and wholly foreign actors from U.S. antitrust laws
unless their conduct results in direct or substantial adverse effects on U.S.
At the same time, the FTAIA expressly
domestic commerce.41
acknowledges that foreigners may bring suits in U.S. courts as a means to
deter illegal antitrust activity that harms competition in the United States.42
Congress left the courts to resolve the question of whether to consider
questions of comity, stating that the FTAIA “is intended neither to prevent
nor to encourage additional judicial recognition of the special international
characteristics of transactions.”43 Following the enactment of the FTAIA,
the Supreme Court seemed to indicate a complete abandonment of the
doctrine of comity in its determination of subject matter jurisdiction.44 In
Hartford Fire, the Court held that comity concerns could only be
considered after other jurisdictional requirements were satisfied, and even
the Sherman Act”).
40. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2489
(mentioning that “a perception exists among businessmen . . . that antitrust law prohibits
efficiency-enhancing joint export activities”).
41. See id. at 8-9, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2493-94 (clarifying that
enacting this statute promotes predictability regarding when U.S. antitrust laws will apply to
international business transactions).
42. See Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust
Cases, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275, 297-99 (2002) (exploring the Supreme Court’s
holding in Pfizer v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978), that the FTAIA permits
foreign claimants to bring U.S. antitrust actions in U.S. courts); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97686, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2495 (citing Pfizer to support the
proposition that “to deny foreigners a recovery could under some circumstances so limit the
deterrent effect of United States antitrust law that defendants would continue to violate
[U.S.] laws, willingly risking the smaller amount of damages payable to injured domestic
persons”). In Pfizer, the Court determined that foreign plaintiffs could sue in U.S. courts
and justified its decision by acknowledging “American consumers are benefited by the
maximum deterrent effect of treble damages upon all potential violators.” 434 U.S. at 315.
43. H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498. Congress
indicated that the first step in a court’s analysis should be to determine whether subject
matter jurisdiction exists. Id. Once such a finding is made, the FTAIA should “have no
effect on the courts’ ability to employ notions of comity, or otherwise take into account the
international character of the transaction.” Id. (citing Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
Am., 549 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1977)).
44. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 774-75 (1993) (refusing to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction a case involving a conspiracy by London-based reinsurance
companies devised entirely outside of the United States and aimed at limiting insurance
coverage in the United States). Many commentators predicted that the doctrine of comity
would eventually disappear from court opinions. See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, The
Twilight of Comity, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 564-65 (2000) (stating that the
Supreme Court “dealt comity a near death blow” and predicting that invoking comity would
unlikely be successful in achieving the dismissal of an antitrust case after Hartford Fire);
see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionism:
The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 393, 432 (1994)
(stating that the Supreme Court’s view that a conflict of laws was a necessary precondition
for the application of the doctrine of comity “undercuts the comity doctrine and clears the
way for broader extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws”).
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then, comity could only be a factor when a “true conflict” between U.S.
and foreign law existed.45 The Supreme Court eventually backed away
from such a limited use of the comity doctrine and followed Justice
Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire,46 in which he argued that even if the
presumption against applying U.S. laws extraterritorially is overcome, “an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains.”47
C. The Circuits Split on the Interpretation of the FTAIA Jurisdictional
Requirement that a Domestic Effect “Give[] Rise to a Claim”
Although Congress enacted the FTAIA to clarify how federal courts
should determine subject matter jurisdiction over an extraterritorial
antitrust claim,48 the language of the statute eventually led to a split in the
circuits.49 The circuit split on the meaning of “a claim” signaled that the
issue was prime for consideration by the Supreme Court.50 The Court had
to resolve whether to accept the expansive or the restrictive interpretation
of the FTAIA, by setting a standard that federal courts could follow when
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over extraterritorial claims.51
45. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 798-99 (finding there was no conflict
between U.S. and British law, even though the conduct in this case conformed to British law
but violated U.S. law). The Court stated that a true conflict only arises when it is impossible
for an international actor to conduct itself in a manner that leads to compliance with the laws
of two nations. Id. at 799. Because British law did not compel the London reinsurance
companies to engage in agreements to set insurance terms which violated U.S. laws, there
was no conflict, as the reinsurers could have chosen to act in a manner that would comply
with both U.S. and British laws. Id.
46. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164-65 (2004)
(citing Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817, to support the Court’s
adoption of the rule of construction where the court “assume[s] that legislators take account
of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write American laws”).
47. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)). Justice Scalia contended that federal
courts could not assert subject matter jurisdiction over the case because of the conflict
between the laws of the United States and Great Britain. See id. at 821 (stating that when
foreign and domestic laws provide different rules governing a dispute, courts should
undertake a conflict-of-laws analysis).
48. See discussion supra Part I.B.
49. See Riazi, supra note 23, at 1286 (articulating the main issue in the circuit split as
whether or not the second prong of the FTAIA “closed the federal courthouse door on the
plaintiffs”). At least one commentator has described the FTAIA as a “drafting disaster”
where courts were left to manage and interpret the standards set out by the statute, leading to
different approaches undertaken in its application. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA
and Subject Matter Jurisdiction over Foreign Transactions Under the Antitrust Laws: The
New Frontier in Antitrust Litigation, 56 SMU L. REV. 2151, 2157 (2003) (characterizing the
FTAIA as “difficult to read” and “difficult to comprehend” and asserting that poor
draftsmanship is to blame for the Act’s varied interpretations).
50. See Köster & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 726 (commenting that Supreme Court
review is necessary to resolve the split in the circuits on the question of the jurisdictional
reach of the Sherman Act, as provided by the FTAIA).
51. See id. at 727-28 (predicting correctly that the Court would curtail the jurisdiction
of the Sherman Act as the Fifth Circuit did).
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The split centered on the interpretation of one word: what the FTAIA
meant by “a claim.”52 Courts developed three different interpretations of
what a plaintiff had to show to establish the jurisdictional requirement that
the domestic effect “give[] rise to a claim.”53 Under the Fifth Circuit’s
narrow interpretation, courts could only assert jurisdiction where an
anticompetitive domestic effect gave rise to the plaintiff’s specific injury.54
In other words, the requirement that the injury give rise to “a claim” meant
“the plaintiff’s claim” not merely “anyone’s claim.”55 In contrast, the
Second Circuit’s broad interpretation only required plaintiffs to show that
the anticompetitive conduct produced effects on U.S. domestic commerce
that violated the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act.56 Thus, the
plaintiff merely had to argue that the activity affecting U.S. domestic
commerce could give rise to “any claim” because the Sherman Act
prohibited the conduct.57
Finally, the D.C. Circuit established a “middle of the road” approach58
where courts could assert jurisdiction over claims of alleged

52. See discussion infra Part I.C (comparing the differing interpretations that three
circuit courts adopted when deciding this question).
53. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text (describing the approaches taken by
the Fifth, Second, and D.C. Circuit Courts).
54. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir.
2001) (asserting that “the FTAIA requires more than a ‘close relationship’ between the
domestic injury and the plaintiff’s claim”). In that case, Statoil, a Norwegian oil company
that drilled exclusively in the North Sea, claimed that heavy-lift barge services companies in
the Gulf of Mexico, the North Sea, and the Far East, conspired to create a market allocation
scheme so that the companies involved could maintain monopolies over the areas they
served. Id. at 422. Under the conspiracy agreement, Heeremac and McDermott would take
on all the projects in the Gulf of Mexico and Saipem would receive a higher allocation of
projects in the North Sea in exchange for not involving itself in any projects in the Gulf. Id.
Statoil claimed that the scheme led to the inflation of its operating costs in the North Sea
and that the effects of the monopolistic scheme gave rise to a Sherman Act claim in the
United States because U.S. companies were also affected by the higher prices they had to
pay for heavy-lift services. Id. at 425. The Fifth Circuit rejected Statoil’s arguments,
finding instead that the domestic effect did not give rise to Statoil’s claim since Statoil’s
injury arose from inflated prices in the North Sea, while the higher prices U.S. companies
paid for heavy-lift services arose from inflated prices in the Gulf of Mexico. Id. at 427.
55. See id. at 427 n.22 (framing the appropriate inquiry as whether the plaintiff’s injury
was the result of anticompetitive effects in the U.S. market “regardless of the situs of the
plaintiff’s injury”).
56. See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l P.L.C., 284 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 2002) (involving
plaintiffs who purchased items at auctions conducted outside the United States that filed a
class action lawsuit against Christie’s and Sotheby’s for conspiring to set buyer’s premiums
and seller’s commissions at identical levels).
57. See id. at 399-400 (supporting its reading of the FTAIA by citing legislative history,
which states that the impact of the illegal conduct does not need to be experienced by the
injured party within the United States). A plain reading of the language of the FTAIA
supported this interpretation of the statute, the court reasoned, because “Congress used the
indefinite article (‘a’) rather than the definite article (‘the’).” Id. at 400.
58. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 350 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (recognizing that “[o]ur view of the statute falls somewhere between the views of the
Fifth and Second Circuits, albeit somewhat closer to the latter than the former”).
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anticompetitive conduct if the conduct violated the Sherman Act and the
conduct gave rise to “‘a claim’ by someone, even if not the foreign plaintiff
who is before the court.”59 In Empagran, foreign plaintiffs brought an
action on behalf of foreign and domestic purchasers, who bought bulk
vitamins “for delivery outside the United States,”60 against foreign and
domestic corporations who distributed and sold bulk vitamin products
around the world, alleging that they conspired to raise prices for vitamins.61
The plaintiffs maintained that the basis for subject matter jurisdiction was
that the defendants’ conduct was of a “global nature” producing worldwide effects.62 The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,63 and rejected the district
court’s finding that the plaintiffs’ showing “that other persons were injured
by such United States effects” was insufficient under the FTAIA.64
Instead, under the circuit court’s reading of the FTAIA, the foreign
plaintiffs could sue in a U.S. federal court because the alleged
anticompetitive conduct affected prices in the United States, regardless of
the fact that the foreign plaintiffs in this case had not actually purchased
bulk vitamins in the United States.65
Imagine a situation where only five companies in the world manufacture
sneakers. The five companies conspire to fix the price of sneakers in all of
their respective markets at $150 each. The United States is one of the
markets affected by the inflated prices. An Ecuadorian retailer brings suit
in the United States on behalf of purchasers of sneakers that bought the
sneakers outside the United States.
Under the Second Circuit’s
interpretation, the retailer could successfully bring the suit because the
Sherman Act prohibits price-fixing. The retailer would also be successful
in the D.C. Circuit because the price of sneakers is higher in the United
States as well, and in theory, someone in the United States could
59. Id. at 341.
60. Id. at 342.
61. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, No. Civ. 001686TFH, 2001 WL 761360,
at *3 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001).
62. See id. (establishing that the plaintiffs’ argument was that, because the conspiracy
fixed prices world-wide, any foreign purchaser paid inflated prices for bulk vitamins
abroad).
63. See id. (dismissing the case because the plaintiffs’ injuries did not allege that their
“precise injuries” have the “requisite domestic effects necessary to provide subject matter
jurisdiction over this case”). After the district court dismissed their claim, the domestic
purchasers transferred their claim to another pending suit, and therefore did not take part in
the subsequent appeal. Empagran, 315 F.3d at 343.
64. Empagran, 315 F.3d at 340.
65. See id. at 349-50 (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s restrictive interpretation of the
FTAIA and explaining that the foreign plaintiff does not necessarily have to suffer injury in
the United States, as long as it can show that someone could bring a claim based on the U.S.
anticompetitive conduct). The court later clarified that “the plaintiff must allege that some
private person or entity has suffered actual or threatened injury as a result of the U.S. effect
of the defendant’s violation of the Sherman Act.” Id. at 352.
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successfully bring such a suit. However, the retailer would be unsuccessful
in the Fifth Circuit because the fact that prices are inflated in the United
States did not give rise to the purchasers’ specific injury (i.e., paying higher
prices for sneakers in Ecuador).
II. THE SUPREME COURT ESTABLISHES THE INDEPENDENT EFFECTS TEST
AND THE D.C. CIRCUIT IMPOSES PROXIMATE CAUSATION
In resolving the split in the circuits, the Supreme Court embraced the
Fifth Circuit’s more restrictive reading of the FTAIA’s language, clarifying
that “a claim” meant “the plaintiff’s claim” or “the claim at issue.”66 Under
this ruling, the plaintiff must first show that the conduct that caused its
harm also “significantly and adversely”67 affected U.S. domestic commerce
or customers within the United States.68 In addition, the plaintiff must
show that its foreign injury is linked to the adverse effect on U.S.
commerce.69 Thus, the FTAIA does not apply when “the foreign effect is
independent of any adverse domestic effect.”70
According to the Court, this reading of the statutory language is the most
compatible with the FTAIA’s legislative history.71 The Court based its
analysis of the FTAIA jurisdictional test on the doctrine of international
comity, asserting that it “ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.”72
Congress, it reasoned, had no intention of allowing U.S. antitrust laws to

66. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 172-74 (2004)
(concluding, after an examination of the FTAIA legislative history and the doctrine of
comity, that this reading is consistent with congressional intent in enacting the statute).
67. Id. at 164.
68. See id. at 161-62 (observing that the Sherman Act does not prevent American
exporters from entering into anticompetitive arrangements abroad as long as the conduct
only adversely affects foreign markets).
69. See id. at 165-67 (stating that although Congress created an exception for plaintiffs
seeking redress from anticompetitive conduct that gives rise to foreign as well as domestic
harm, it did not expand the Sherman Act’s jurisdictional reach to such an extent that a
plaintiff with an independent foreign injury may sue in U.S. courts).
70. See id. at 163-64 (emphasis added) (assuming that the price-fixing conspiracy at
hand “significantly and adversely” affected customers in the United States and abroad, but
“the adverse foreign effect [was] independent of any adverse domestic effect”). The Court
based its ruling on this assumption because, although the plaintiffs alleged that the pricefixing conspiracy generally had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
U.S. commerce, such as conducting meetings and agreements in the United States among
the defendants to establish the price-fixing scheme, they did not allege that they purchased
any vitamins in the United States. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, No. Civ.
001686TFH, 2001 WL 761360, at *3 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001). Therefore, the Supreme Court
assumed that the “relevant ‘transactions occur[ed] entirely outside U.S. commerce.’”
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 160 (quoting Empagran, 2001 WL 761360, at *4).
71. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 169 (supporting the Court’s holding by remarking that
“Congress designed the FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any
significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign commerce”).
72. Id. at 164.
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interfere with the ability of foreign nations to enforce their own laws to
regulate commercial activity affecting their own markets.73 The Court
questioned:
Why should American law supplant . . . Canada’s or Great Britain’s or
Japan’s own determination about how best to protect Canadian or British
or Japanese customers from anticompetitive conduct engaged in
significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign
companies?74

The Court also indicated that its holding would result in a more efficient
handling of claims brought by foreign plaintiffs.75 The Court refused to
create a rule that would allow courts to take account of comity
considerations on a case-by-case basis.76 This approach would be
unworkable because it would force federal courts to engage in a timeconsuming analysis of foreign and domestic law for every case before
them.77 The Court further noted that the procedural delays that would
result from such a rule would interfere with a foreign country’s ability to
enforce and maintain its own antitrust system.78 Instead, excluding all
independent foreign injury cases from the jurisdiction of federal courts
prevents federal judges from having to undertake this comparative analysis
altogether.79
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit to resolve the
issue of whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over Empagran’s
alternate theory that “because vitamins are fungible and readily
transportable, without an adverse domestic effect (i.e., higher prices in the
73. See id. at 169 (articulating that, although Congress may have hoped that other
countries would enact laws similar to U.S. antitrust laws, it cannot impose them on other
countries that have chosen to pursue other policies). The Supreme Court indicated that
following the D.C. Circuit’s approach to asserting jurisdiction would have unwanted effects
of opening the floodgates to foreign plaintiffs hoping to evade their own laws:
[T]he United States courts would provide worldwide subject matter jurisdiction to
any foreign suitor wishing to sue its own local supplier, but unhappy with its own
sovereign’s provisions for private antitrust enforcement, provided that a different
plaintiff had a cause of action against a different firm for injuries that were within
U.S. [other-than-import] commerce.
Id. at 166 (citing 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 273
(Supp. 2003), which concluded that this is a reasonable limitation that Congress would
impose).
74. Id. at 165.
75. See id. at 167-69 (indicating that courts would be unable to undertake a lengthy and
complicated comparison of U.S. and foreign interests “simply and expeditiously”).
76. Id. at 168.
77. See id. (explaining that, because the Sherman Act covers different types of
anticompetitive agreements, such an analysis would be highly technical and would result in
lengthy proceedings and high procedural costs and delays).
78. Id.
79. Id.; see discussion infra Part III.C (explaining how judges may avoid entertaining
an inquiry on the merits of the case by dismissing it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
through a 12(b)(1) motion).
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United States), the sellers could not have maintained their international
price-fixing arrangement and respondents would not have suffered their
foreign injury.”80 Thus, the question the D.C. Circuit was presented with
was whether but-for causation was “sufficient to bring the price-fixing
conduct within the scope of the FTAIA’s exception.”81 Empagran argued
that because F. Hoffmann-LaRoche and its alleged co-conspirators globally
marketed bulk vitamins, they were able to sustain artificially inflated prices
world-wide, including in the United States.82 If prices were not inflated in
the United States, overseas purchasers could have purchased the vitamins at
lower prices in the U.S. market, which would have prevented the
conspirators from maintaining their price scheme.83 Therefore, the inflated
prices in the United States gave rise to the foreign injury—paying higher
prices abroad.84
In a short opinion by Circuit Judge Henderson, the D.C. Circuit held that
it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this alternate theory of
liability because a showing of but-for causation is insufficient to establish
jurisdiction under the FTAIA domestic injury exception.85 Instead, the
court asserted that the FTAIA’s causation language—“gives rise to”—
80. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1269 (D.C. Cir.
2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3288 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2005) (No. 05-541) (quoting
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175).
81. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 175.
82. See Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1270. The vitamin industry has a relatively small
number of producers so that when the defendants entered into a price-fixing and marketallocation scheme, it prevented vitamins from being traded between North America and
other regions. Corrected Brief for Appellants at 16-17, Empagran, 417 F.3d 1267 (No. 017115) [hereinafter Corrected Brief for Appellants]. The fact that vitamins are fungible
goods, meaning they are exchangeable and are not specified by ownership, furthered the
claim because the vitamins could easily be sold to any willing purchaser (unlike, for
example, high technology products made specifically for one customer). See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 714 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “fungible goods” as “goods that are
interchangeable with one another; goods that, by nature or trade usage, are the equivalent of
any other like unit, such as coffee or grain”). The appellants therefore argued that if the
defendants had not controlled the U.S. market in this way, other companies could have
undercut the cartel’s prices and led to its collapse. See Corrected Brief for Appellants,
supra, at 18.
83. Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1271. Because U.S. consumers constitute such a large share
of the world market in bulk vitamins, it was imperative that defendants control U.S. markets
to ensure the survival of the cartel. Corrected Brief for Appellants, supra note 82, at 19. In
this way, the argument progresses, the price-fixing and market allocation schemes had a
direct, substantial, and reasonable effect on the U.S. domestic market, which in turn gave
rise to the plaintiffs’ claim (i.e., paying artificially inflated prices abroad). See Brief of
Amici Curiae Legal Scholars in Support of Respondents at 5-6, Empagran, 417 F.3d 1267
(No. 01-7115) (contending that jurisdiction over Empagran would be proper because “the
cartelists’ conduct . . . had a ‘substantial effect’ on ‘trade or commerce . . . with foreign
nations,’ where there was an intertwined effect on imports and exports of vitamins”).
84. Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1271.
85. See id. (finding that it was not enough to argue that the vitamin market is a “single,
global market”). Such an argument, the court maintained, establishes merely an indirect
connection between the inflated U.S. prices and the inflated prices paid by foreign
purchasers which gave rise to the claim. Id.
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indicated that plaintiffs had to show “a direct causal relationship, that is
proximate causation,” between adverse domestic effects and the alleged
foreign harm in order to recover.86 The court concluded that this more
restrictive reading of the FTAIA prevents “open[ing] the door to . . .
interference with other nations’ prerogative to safeguard their own citizens
from anti-competitive activity within their own borders.”87
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S PROXIMATE CAUSE STANDARD IS CONSISTENT
WITH SUPREME COURT DIRECTIVES AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
On remand from the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit established that,
for a claim to satisfy the Supreme Court’s independent effects test, the
plaintiff must show a direct link between an alleged foreign harm and a
U.S. adverse domestic effect.88 The imposition of such a standard will
likely have the effect of limiting access to federal courts by foreign
plaintiffs with claims only marginally tied to anticompetitive effects in the
U.S. marketplace.89 At the same time, a more restrictive jurisdictional
standard may have the broader result of decreasing the overall deterrent
effect of U.S. antitrust laws.90 Nevertheless, other circuit courts should
follow the D.C. Circuit’s imposition of proximate causation as the basis for
establishing jurisdiction under the Supreme Court’s independent effects test
because it is in line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Empagran91 and
it correlates with legislative intent in passing the Sherman Act and the
FTAIA.92 Although the general deterrent effect of U.S. antitrust laws may
be sacrificed in the interest of observing the sovereignty of other nations
which may have less stringent antitrust laws,93 such an outcome is
consistent with three U.S. interests, discussed below: (1) protecting the
86. See id. (implying that the “mere but-for ‘nexus’” is not in line with the plain
language of the FTAIA).
87. Id. (alluding to the Supreme Court’s warnings that a more expansive interpretation
of the FTAIA could lead to supplanting other nations’ determinations about how to regulate
anticompetitive conduct affecting their markets).
88. See id. (requiring plaintiffs to show that their foreign injury was directly tied to the
anticompetitive effects occurring in the United States); see also supra notes 85-87 and
accompanying text (discussing the court’s reasoning in establishing proximate causation as
the threshold test for determining subject matter jurisdiction).
89. See discussion infra Part III.B-C.
90. See discussion infra Part III.B.
91. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004)
(holding that the principles of comity provide support for holding that foreign plaintiffs may
bring suit in the United States only when they can show that their foreign injury is
dependent on domestic effects).
92. See discussion infra Part II.A-C (supporting the claim that proximate causation is
consistent with legislative intent). See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 36, §
273(a) (maintaining that when foreign conduct is involved, courts should be mindful of the
will of Congress).
93. See discussion infra Part III.A-B (discussing the impact of requiring proximate
causation as it relates to deterrence and comity analysis).
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welfare of U.S. consumers rather than the world’s consumers;94 (2)
maintaining good relations with foreign nations;95 and (3) relieving the
overburdened federal court system.96
A.

Restricting the Exercise of Jurisdiction Over Foreign Claims Reflects
Congress’ Intent That U.S. Laws Protect Only U.S. Commerce From
Harmful Antitrust Activity

The Supreme Court has lauded private antitrust actions as “a significant
supplement” to the efforts by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to enforce
antitrust laws and deter anticompetitive conduct.97 However, maintaining
general deterrence policies is not of sufficient “empirical significance” to
offset the prevailing importance of narrowly construing the reach of U.S.
antitrust laws.98 A narrow application of these laws avoids interference
with the interests of foreign nations whose claims are only marginally
linked to U.S. domestic commerce.99 Although Congress passed the
Sherman Act to deter anticompetitive conduct that harms consumers,100 it is
unlikely that it envisioned the extraterritorial application that some circuit
courts subsequently permitted.101 Congress never contemplated the
expansion of the U.S. antitrust laws’ reach to such an extent that federal
courts essentially became the world’s courts.102 The history behind early
94. See discussion infra Part III.A.
95. See discussion infra Part III.B.
96. See discussion infra Part III.C.
97. See Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 572-73 n.10
(1982) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979)) (finding a party civilly
liable for the antitrust violations of its agents in a suit brought by a private plaintiff).
98. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 174-75 (2004)
(supporting the Court’s view by emphasizing that it is unclear which deterrence policies are
preferable).
99. See id. at 169-70 (noting that competing briefs in this case analyzed data available
regarding the role of private actions in deterring anticompetitive conduct, and reached
opposite conclusions: “(1) that potential treble-damage liability would help enforce
widespread anti-price-fixing norms (through added deterrence) and (2) . . . that such liability
would hinder antitrust enforcement (by reducing incentives to enter amnesty programs)”).
Because it is impossible to determine conclusively the effect of restricted jurisdiction on
deterrence, the Court refused to allow those considerations to factor into its decision. Id.
100. See Buswell, supra note 7, at 996 (stating that the “primary” and “underlying
purpose” of the antitrust laws is deterrence of anticompetitive activity); supra notes 19-22
and accompanying text (providing support for stating that Congress intended to deter
anticompetitive conduct and protect U.S. domestic commerce by enacting U.S. antitrust
laws).
101. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427-28 (5th
Cir. 2001) (noting that Congress never intended a broad extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws that would allow plaintiffs having injuries “unrelated to the injuries suffered
in the United States” to flock to U.S. courts).
102. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 36, § 273(a) (asserting that “Congress did
not intend American antitrust law to rule the entire commercial world; and Congress knew
that domestic economic circumstances often differ from those abroad”); see also Joshua P.
Davis, Supreme Court Review of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: A Case of
a Misleading Question?, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 431, 447 (2004) (stating that “the FTAIA
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U.S. antitrust laws indicates a “primary concern for the domestic market
and an initial reluctance to intervene in foreign anticompetitive
arrangements.”103 Although the underlying policy reason for the Sherman
Act was that of ensuring consumer economic welfare,104 it is clear that
neither the Sherman Act nor any other U.S. antitrust law was formulated to
regulate commercial activity with little or no effect in the United States.105
Recent legislative history supports this view, suggesting that Congress
intended to limit the reach of the Sherman Act through the FTAIA so that
foreign plaintiffs could only bring suits in the United States when their
foreign injury had a direct and substantial link to U.S. commerce.106
However, deterrence should remain an important U.S. interest where it
stops adverse anticompetitive conduct for the purpose of protecting the
welfare of U.S. consumers.107 The FTAIA reflects such an interpretation of
U.S. deterrence policy in that the FTAIA, by its plain language, does not
prohibit U.S. exporters from engaging in anticompetitive conduct that
affects solely foreign markets,108 nor does it prohibit foreigners from
indicates that Congress was somewhat less concerned with antitrust injuries abroad than
with those in the United States”).
103. See Clifford A. Jones, The Growth of Private Rights of Action Outside the U.S.:
Exporting Antitrust Courtrooms to the World: Private Enforcement in a Global Market, 16
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 409, 412 (2004) (explaining that the move toward greater interest
in international cartels began in 1938 after the discovery of the existence of pre-World War
I cartels in which several American firms participated).
104. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 71
(1978) (asserting that the legislative intent behind the U.S. antitrust laws “overwhelmingly
support[s] the conclusion that the antitrust laws should be interpreted as designed for the
sole purpose of forwarding consumer welfare”). Bork argues that courts should work
toward maintaining consistency within the body of antitrust laws; courts should therefore
read antitrust laws in light of the overarching goal of promoting consumer welfare unless
congressional intent indicates a contrary reading. Id.
105. See ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW 16 (1980) (quoting
Senator Sherman, who argued on behalf of his proposed bill, “[w]hile we should not stretch
the powers granted to Congress by strained construction, we cannot surrender any of them;
they are not ours to surrender; but whenever occasion calls, we should exercise them for the
benefit and protection of the people of the United States”); see also BORK, supra note 104,
at 20 (noting that the language of the Sherman Act was “opaque” and chosen “to allay fears
that the law might go beyond the then narrowly conceived commerce power of Congress”).
106. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 249495 (clarifying that wholly foreign transactions and export transactions are not subject to the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts “absent a direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on
domestic commerce or a domestic competitor”). See generally Cavanaugh, supra note 49,
at 2185 (arguing that Congress did not intend to expand subject matter jurisdiction through
the FTAIA for the purpose of increasing deterrence).
107. See Neal R. Stoll & Shepard Goldfein, Limiting the Sherman Act’s
Extraterritoriality, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 14, 2004, at 6 (quoting Judge Kaplan as saying that
“[u]nless the Court is to impute to Congress an intention to establish an antitrust regime to
cover the world, the answer must be that no subject matter jurisdiction exists where a
foreign plaintiff alleges harm from foreign effects”); see also Delrahim Speech, supra note
8, at 7 (arguing that allowing class action suits by foreign plaintiffs claiming foreign injuries
is inconsistent with the purpose of U.S. antitrust laws, which is “to protect consumers,
competition, and commerce in the United States”) (emphasis added).
108. H.R. REP. No. 97-686 at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2495. The

CASEY OFFTOPRINTER

604

2/24/2006 1:59:37 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:585

engaging in anticompetitive conduct in foreign markets.109 Although a
domestic firm or individual may seek recourse in U.S. courts if it is
affected by U.S. exporters’ anticompetitive conduct, a foreign firm
similarly affected may not bring suit in the United States.110 The
legislature must constantly make value trade-offs, assessing “how much
consumer welfare is to be sacrificed for what amount of additional wealth
for small dealers and worthy men.”111 From the point of view of U.S.
interests, there is no need to deter anticompetitive conduct that does not
negatively impact the welfare of the U.S. consumer or the interest of U.S.
businesses.112 The legislature has therefore sacrificed foreign consumer
welfare in exchange for protecting U.S. exporters (although those exporters
may be liable for their conduct in other places).113
It is also important to note that private actions are not the sole means of
deterring anticompetitive conduct; the government also pursues the goal of
House Report emphasizes that courts cannot assert jurisdiction over claims where exportoriented activity results in solely foreign anticompetitive effects:
[A] price-fixing conspiracy directed solely to exported products or services, absent
a spillover effect on the domestic marketplace, would normally not have the
requisite effects on domestic or import commerce. Foreign buyers injured by such
export conduct would have to seek recourse in their home courts.
Id.
109. See supra notes 37 and 41 and accompanying text (clarifying that the FTAIA does
not apply to all non-import activity, which encompasses exports and wholly foreign
conduct).
110. See H.R. REP. No. 97-686 at 10-11, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2495-96
(“[A] domestic exporter is assured a remedy under our antitrust laws for injury caused by
unlawful conduct of a competing United States exporter. But a foreign firm whose
nondomestic operations were injured by the very same export oriented conduct would have
no remedy under our antitrust laws.”).
111. See BORK, supra note 104, at 79-80 (explaining that in the case of price-fixing,
there is always a conflict between consumer and producer interests and the legislature must
find a way to balance these interests). The decision to protect exporters through the FTAIA
is rational, as anticompetitive conduct undertaken by U.S. exporters will pose little danger to
the United States, in comparison to agreements affecting imports. Note, supra note 21, at
2143. The export exception therefore reflects the optimal antitrust policy: U.S. exporters
are able to increase profits through anticompetitive conduct affecting solely foreign
commerce, and the welfare loss from the U.S. national perspective is zero. Id.
112. The deterrent function of U.S. antitrust laws is thus preserved, as plaintiffs may
freely seek redress in U.S. courts when the anticompetitive conduct that caused their harm is
directly linked to adverse U.S. domestic anticompetitive effects. Empagran S.A. v. F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
113. See Stoll & Goldfein, supra note 107, at 6 (quoting the solicitor general, who stated
that “policy considerations based on deterrence counsel against the panel’s expansive
interpretation of the FTAIA that permits suits for injuries sustained abroad that arise from
foreign conduct”). Such a view is bolstered by the facts in Empagran, a suit brought on
behalf of foreign plaintiffs who purchased bulk vitamins outside the United States:
plaintiffs, whose own injuries arise out of effects on foreign commerce, should not be able
to recover under U.S. antitrust laws, but instead, should “seek redress under the law of the
land where the effects occurred; a view that merges with the original, stated goal of the
Sherman Act—to protect American trade.” Id.; see Note, supra note 21, at 2143 (suggesting
that the existence of the FTAIA’s export exception refutes the possibility that the United
States has any economic interest in protecting competition simply for its own sake in
international trade).
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deterring anticompetitive conduct through avenues such as the DOJ’s
leniency program.114 The leniency program is designed to protect from
criminal prosecution corporations or individuals who reveal the misconduct
of their co-conspirators before an investigation is underway.115 In many
cases, a conspiracy would likely remain undetected if not for the fact that a
co-conspirator discloses its wrongdoing and breaks ranks with its
cohorts.116 Since the informant remains vulnerable to private civil actions
under a system with an expansive jurisdictional test,117 unlimited civil
liability serves to discourage corporations and individuals from confessing
antitrust violations.118 The informants could face an endless amount of
private suits for treble damages from foreign plaintiffs around the world.119
For this reason, it is preferable to limit foreign plaintiffs’ access to U.S.
courts so that informants continue providing information to the
government.120 In this sense, a more restrictive jurisdictional standard
114. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19, F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03-724) [hereinafter
Brief for the United States] (arguing that price-fixing conspiracies are difficult to detect, so
the DOJ’s amnesty program serves an important role as an enforcement tool by providing
incentives for co-conspirators to come forward). But see Jones, supra note 103, at 411
(stating that private antitrust actions in the United States maintain a ten to one ratio to
government enforcement efforts, indicating that they are an effective means to provide
compensation for victims and penalties for violators).
115. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIVIDUAL LENIENCY POLICY 1 (1994),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0092.pdf (providing for leniency if the
individual “reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides
full . . . cooperation”); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY 1 (1993),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf (allowing corporations to avoid
criminal prosecution if they report illegal antitrust activity “at an early stage”).
116. See Brief for the United States, supra note 114, at 19 (asserting that price-fixing
conspiracies are “inherently difficult to detect and prosecute”). The government also
pointed out that the amnesty program has led to the investigation of the “majority of the
Antitrust Division’s major international investigations, including the investigation of the
vitamin cartel.”; id. at 20. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REPORT ON THE
NATURE AND IMPACT OF HARD CORE CARTELS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS UNDER
NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS 3 (2002), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/20/2081831.pdf
(acknowledging that only one in seven of all international cartels are detected).
117. See Salil K. Mehra, More is Less: A Law-and-Economics Approach to the
International Scope of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 77 TEMPLE L. REV. 47, 54 (2004)
(explaining that the Justice Department restricts its amnesty to criminal prosecutions only,
so private plaintiffs may freely bring civil actions against violators that have reported illegal
activities).
118. See Brief for the United States, supra note 114, at 20 (reasoning that, if federal
courts could assert jurisdiction over antitrust conduct occurring abroad, potential amnesty
applicants would decide not to come forward because that would mean increasing the scope
of their civil liability exposure). But see H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 10 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2495 (maintaining that allowing foreign plaintiffs to sue in U.S.
courts helps to deter cartels because “defendants would [otherwise] continue to violate
[U.S.] laws, willingly risking the smaller amounts of damages payable only to injured
domestic persons”).
119. See Brief for the United States, supra note 114, at 20 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)
(2000), which provides that even if conspirators come forward and receive amnesty from
criminal prosecution, they are still vulnerable to civil suit).
120. See James M. Griffin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep’t of
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serves to foster greater deterrence through government enforcement.121
Reexamine the facts described in the Ecuadorian sneaker retailer
example above. Proponents of a broader jurisdictional reach would argue
that the sneaker manufacturers would be less inclined to enter a conspiracy
in a global environment where any one of their millions of customers could
sue for treble damages. Thus, broad jurisdiction would deter the cartel from
ever forming, as conspirators would evaluate the potential costs and
benefits of the activity and likely decide that unlimited civil liability would
be too high a cost to bear. This, however, assumes they will get caught.
Supporters of broader jurisdiction argue from an economic standpoint that
making treble damages available to a larger number of plaintiffs produces
stronger disincentives to potential violators, thereby reducing the overall
number of global cartels.122
Although this may be true for some anticompetitive behavior, it fails to
take into consideration the concealability of certain activities such as pricefixing.123 In those situations, increasing the likelihood of detection may
Justice, An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of International
Cartels, Address Before the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law 48th
Annual
Spring
Meeting
4
(Apr.
6,
2000),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4489.pdf (asserting that the leniency program
achieves the government’s goal of early detection of antitrust violations).
121. See WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: THE UNEASY CASE FOR TREBLE DAMAGES (1974), reprinted in
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW, at 346 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds.,
1979) (noting that “the public agency has the edge in investigating antitrust violations, if not
in litigating them as well”); see also Cavanaugh, supra note 49, at 2185 (stating that even if
the argument that barring foreign plaintiffs from suing in U.S. courts will decrease
deterrence was correct, allowing such suits “may well have the perverse effect of decreasing
overall deterrence” by undermining the DOJ’s leniency program). But see ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 116, at 3 (concluding that strong sanctions provide
incentives for whistleblowers to resort to the protection of leniency programs).
122. See Corrected Brief for Appellants, supra note 82, at 37 (arguing that suits
legitimately brought in the U.S. “may not provide sufficient deterrence,” as a violator could
offset its liability in the United States through its illegal operations abroad). But see Davis,
supra note 102, at 447 (stating that it is not necessary to impose treble damages for all
injuries caused by an international antitrust violation to deter conspirators from affecting
U.S. commerce, as U.S. competitive markets are likely to act to deprive conspirators of
“some, if not all, of the spoils from anticompetitive conduct”). Davis concludes that,
although exposure to civil liability in the United States may not account for the full injuries
caused by the conspiracy throughout the world, but “may generally suffice as deterrence
against causing harm in the United States commerce.” Id.
123. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 226 (1976)
(assessing the social costs of antitrust violations and explaining that “the penalty for a
concealable offense such as price-fixing should be greater than the social costs imposed by
the particular conspiracy in suit”). Posner’s analysis is premised on the idea that the
pecuniary or non-pecuniary penalties assessed against antitrust violators should be equal to
the violation imposed on society. Id. at 221. If the penalty for violating the law were less
than the violation to society, the violator would likely expect the cost of punishment to be
lower than the benefit the violator would derive from continuing to engage in the unlawful
activity. Id. at 221-22. This would lead to excessive amounts of illegal activity. Id.
However, if the penalty for a violation were higher than the social cost, such a system would
deter illegal activity that confers greater benefits on society than the costs it imposes. Id. at
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have a greater effect on deterring conduct than maintaining an expansive
jurisdictional threshold that allows any foreign plaintiff to sue.124 This is
because, in determining whether to engage in anticompetitive behavior, the
prospective violator will discount the punishment cost of the violation by
the probability of actually being discovered to determine the expected cost
of engaging in the unlawful activity.125 By increasing the violator’s
probability of being turned in by an informant, and then allowing the
victims of the anticompetitive conduct affecting U.S. commerce to recover
treble damages, the Empagran decision reflects an efficient mechanism to
achieve the deterrence of conduct harming U.S. commerce. Thus, the
sneaker manufacturers, assessing the risk that one of the conspirators may
denounce the activity, may decide it is more costly to undertake the
activity.
B. A More Restrictive Jurisdictional Standard Ensures the Observance of
the Interests of Foreign Nations in Determining Their Own Regulatory
Schemes
Requiring a “direct causal relationship” between the plaintiff’s foreign
injury and adverse domestic effects accords with principles of comity as it
ensures that courts assert jurisdiction only over cases in which the United
States would have an interest in resolving.126 Eliminating the possibility
that a plaintiff may bring suit in the United States on a claim based on a
“worldwide effect” is significant “because almost all large scale
conspiracies will inevitably affect U.S. commerce.”127 Consequently, a
but-for causation test could give U.S. courts jurisdiction over cases that
would more appropriately be resolved in another forum. The imposition of
a proximate cause standard will therefore prevent the assertion of
jurisdiction over these marginal cases.128 The plain meaning of the FTAIA
222. Posner offers the example of a monopolistic merger that imposes social costs of $1
million, but confers benefits of $2 million through the organization of the market in
question. Id.
124. See Corrected Brief for Appellants, supra note 82, at 21 (stating that the effective
use of the leniency program leads to enhanced detection and disclosure which in turns deters
cartel behavior after the cartel is exposed).
125. See POSNER, supra note 123, at 223 (supporting the theory that punishment cost be
higher than social costs of the violation). For example, if the social cost of a price-fixing
arrangement is $1 million but there is only a twenty-five percent chance of being caught and
punished, if the fine is $1 million, the expected punishment cost will be only $250,000. See
id. at 223-24. Under those circumstances, a violator would have incentive to continue its
illegal activity.
126. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
127. See Burnett, supra note 6, at 629 (arguing that the “worldwide” effects test is a
weak jurisdictional standard).
128. See Empagran, 417 F.3d at 1271 (citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Empagran,
where Justice Breyer questions why U.S. law should supplant the law of foreign nations
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supports such a standard, as it cannot be read to require anything less than a
proximate effect on domestic commerce that gives rise to the alleged
foreign harm.129 The imposition of a stronger nexus between the alleged
injury and a domestic effect “show[s] deference to other nations and
regulatory bodies who have a significant interest in regulating
anticompetitive effects occurring within their own territory.”130
Underlying the Supreme Court’s holding in Empagran was the view that
Congress did not intend courts to exceed the limitations prescribed by
customary international law.131 It is well established in American
jurisprudence that even though a statute may apply extraterritorially,132 it
“should not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or conduct if that
regulation would conflict with principles of international law.”133 Those
regarding their determination about how best to protect their own customers from
anticompetitive conduct caused by foreign companies).
129. The proximate cause standard reflects the FTAIA language requiring a plaintiff to
show the conduct in question had a “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” on
domestic commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (2000). Treatises that examine causation
requirements indicate that proximate causation requires a showing of “direct linkage,”
“substantial factors,” and “natural and probable consequences.” See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 182 (2001) (noting that courts often require a plaintiff proving
proximate cause to show cause in fact and “that the harm or its manner of occurrence was
foreseeable”); see also DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 42 (5th ed.
1984) (clarifying that proximate causation depends on “whether the conduct has been so
significant and important a cause that the defendant should be legally responsible”). The
plain language of the FTAIA is thus indicative of proximate cause standards. See generally
Delrahim Speech, supra note 8, at 11 (recognizing that “the most sensible interpretation of
the term ‘direct’ is as a synonym for ‘proximate cause’”).
130. Burnett, supra note 6, at 628. Considerations of comity advise against applying
U.S. antitrust laws to claims that only marginally affect U.S. domestic commerce. See F.
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165-66 (2004) (questioning the
validity of applying U.S. antitrust laws to claims that are independent of U.S. domestic
effects). The Court began its analysis with one question:
Why is it reasonable to apply this law to conduct that is significantly foreign
insofar as that conduct causes independent foreign harm and that foreign harm
alone gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim? We can find no good answer to that
question.
Id. at 165-66.
131. See Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164 (asserting the statutory rule of construction that
assumes “legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when
they write American laws”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 97-686, at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498 (clarifying that “[t]he Bill is intended neither to prevent nor
encourage additional judicial recognition of the special international characteristics of
transactions”). Congress indicated that a court could balance the interests of foreign nations
after it asserted subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498.
132. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (conceding that the presumption against extraterritoriality has been overcome
with respect to the Sherman Act, so that “it is now well established that the Sherman Act
applies extraterritorially”).
133. Justice Scalia maintains that although Congress may have the constitutional
authority to enact a law that applies extraterritorially, it is “generally presumed” that the
jurisdictional reach of such laws will not exceed the limitations imposed by customary
international law. Id. at 815.
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principles require nations to respect other sovereign nations by limiting the
exercise of their jurisdiction “with respect to a person or activity having
connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable.”134 To prevent the unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction by
U.S. federal courts, the D.C. Circuit clarified the Supreme Court’s
independent effects test to make certain that claims are proximately related
to U.S. commerce before courts may reach beyond U.S. borders to
adjudicate them.135 A more expansive jurisdictional test would therefore
impermissibly allow U.S. courts to act contrary to the interests of foreign
nations.136
Although some nations still do not have antitrust laws, or do not
seriously enforce them, U.S. courts should not be swayed by such factors in
determining whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction absent an
alleged anticompetitive conduct that meets requisite, domestic effects.137
Policy questions, such as deterring anticompetitive conduct occurring
abroad to prevent such effects from eventually harming U.S. commerce,
cannot overcome considerations of comity or yield a different result from
that reached in Empagran.138 Instead, barring a foreign plaintiff’s access to

134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1)
(1987). The Restatement gives a list of relevant factors when determining whether the
exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable, including: to what extent
the activity is linked to the territory of the regulating state; the connections between the
regulating state and the person or activity to be regulated; the character of the activity to be
regulated; whether the regulation may protect or harm existing justified expectations; how
important the regulation is to international politics, law, or economics; how consistent the
regulation is with traditions of the international system; whether other states may have an
interest in regulating the activity; and the likelihood regulation will conflict with the
regulatory scheme of another state. Id. § 403(2)(a)-(h). Exercising extraterritorial
jurisdiction only when reasonable is a principle that the Restatement considers a rule of
international law. Id. § 403 cmt. a.
135. See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267, 1271 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (explaining that a “less direct standard would open the door to just such interference
with other nations’ prerogative to safeguard their own citizens from anti-competitive
activity within their own borders”).
136. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 427-28 (5th
Cir. 2001) (cautioning that under an expansive interpretation of the FTAIA,
any entities, anywhere, that were injured by any conduct that also had sufficient
effect[s] on United States commerce could flock to the United States federal court
for redress, even if those plaintiffs had no commercial relationship with any United
States market and their injuries were unrelated to the injuries suffered in the United
States
).
137. See Wolfgang Wurmnest, Foreign Private Plaintiffs, Global Conspiracies, and the
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 205,
223-24 (2005) (arguing that requiring courts to analyze foreign laws for “adequacy” or
“efficiency” would be a complicated task that could lead to tensions with foreign nations).
138. See F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 174-75 (2004)
(concluding that the dispute over efficient enforcement policies is unclear and not
empirically important enough to “overcome the considerations we have previously
discussed or change our conclusion”).
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federal courts when a showing of proximate causation is absent avoids the
kind of “unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations” that the Supreme Court intended to prevent.139
Consider once again the Ecuadorian sneaker retailer example above.
Suppose one of the conspiring manufacturers from which the retailer
purchased sneakers is from Mexico. The Mexican legislature met and
decided that the best policy for its country is to impose a prison sentence of
ten years on violators in order to send a strong message that such behavior
is intolerable. The Ecuadorian retailer, caring little for the public policy
initiative of Mexico and enticed by the prospect of recovering treble
damages, brings the suit in the United States. Because the retailer is suing
on a “worldwide effects” theory, U.S. courts would rightly reject the claim.
Clearly, Mexico has a greater interest in enforcing its laws against a
violator from its country than does the United States, which is hardly
involved at all. Furthermore, treble damages conflict with Mexico’s
interest of setting an example through jail time, a goal its legislature has
deemed important. There is no reason why U.S. courts in this case should
interfere with Mexico’s legitimate interest in adjudicating the case and
furthering its own regulatory scheme.
It is also important to note that observing the principles of comity does
not mean the United States will have to forgo its interests in deterring
international cartel formation.140 Such an argument was better founded
139. See id. at 164 (noting that “[the] rule of statutory construction cautions courts to
assume that legislators take account of the legitimate interests of other nations when they
write American laws”). The Supreme Court warned that “[e]ffectively, the United States
would provide worldwide subject matter jurisdiction to any foreign suitor wishing to sue its
own local supplier, but unhappy with its own sovereign’s provisions for private antitrust
enforcement.” Id. at 166 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 36, § 273). Justice
Breyer summarized this point well in Empagran when he stated:
Congress might have hoped that America’s antitrust laws, so fundamental a
component of our economic system, would commend themselves to other nations
as well. But, if America’s antitrust policies could not win their own way in the
international marketplace for such ideas, Congress, we must assume, would not
have tried to impose them, in an act of legal imperialism, through legislative fiat.
Id. at 169.
140. See Cavanaugh, supra note 49, at 2189 (noting that failure to assert Sherman Act
jurisdiction over a claim does not necessarily lead to decreased deterrence since “[t]he
conduct in question may well be within the jurisdiction of another antitrust authority, which
may then take appropriate enforcement measures”). Contra Mehra, supra note 42, at 31819 (calling for the adoption of an expansive jurisdictional test that eliminates considerations
of comity because such a standard increases deterrence). According to Mehra, the
possibility that a claim may be dismissed on comity grounds reduces the deterrent effect on
a potential violator who will discount the expected punishment by the probability that the
case will be thrown out based on comity considerations. Id. Thus, a potential violator
would be encouraged to commit a violation of U.S. antitrust law. Id. This argument is
faulty, however, as it ignores the fact that if the violator has engaged in activity that affects
U.S. commerce, U.S. courts can always assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over the claim.
See supra Part II (providing analysis of the jurisdictional test set forth by the Supreme Court
in Empagran, which allows foreign and domestic plaintiffs to sue in U.S. courts where their
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when most other countries did not have significant antitrust laws.141
Currently, more than one hundred countries have enacted antitrust laws,142
and several of those countries are in the process of reviewing their laws and
policies to increase enforcement.143 The further foreign nations develop
their antitrust laws, the greater the risk that the unlimited application of
U.S. antitrust laws may result in an inappropriate interference with the
regulatory policies of sovereign nations.144 This is especially true given the
tensions that already exist due to the fact that most countries have crafted
their domestic policies without including sanctions as high as those
available in the United States145 and do not apply those sanctions as

injury is tied to anticompetitive conduct affecting U.S. domestic commerce).
141. See Cavanaugh, supra note 49, at 2186 (refuting the need to have a more expansive
approach to jurisdiction because such an argument loses force in light of the modern global
economy and because the “antitrust landscape” has changed dramatically since the
enactment of the FTAIA); Joel L. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., The War
Against International Cartels: Lessons from the Battlefront, Address Before Fordham
Corporate Law Institute 9 (Oct. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Klein Speech], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
3747.pdf (conceding that the United States “stood almost alone” in its efforts to deter
antitrust violations for several decades, but recognizing that “the global environment in
which we work today is radically different”). Nations motivated by stronger interests in
protecting “free markets defended by sound antitrust laws and sound antitrust enforcement”
have enacted their own antitrust laws in the past decade. Id. at 9-10.
142. See Delrahim Speech, supra note 8, at 2-3 (explaining that many of these
jurisdictions maintain effective court systems, although not all of them provide for private
rights of action). ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 116, at annex B
(outlining the sanctions available in every OECD country for punishment of hard core
cartels, such as damages, injunctions, imprisonment and fines).
143. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 116, at 4 (listing Brazil,
Canada, Denmark, France, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom as countries that are currently revising their antitrust
laws). Some jurisdictions have also crafted their competition laws so that they may reach
extraterritorial conduct that affects national commerce. See Note, supra note 21, at 2144
(citing as examples Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, France and Australia).
144. See Delrahim Speech, supra note 8, at 8 (insisting that it should not be assumed that
the U.S. antitrust regime “is uniquely well-suited, acting alone, to deter and remedy
anticompetitive behavior across the globe, regardless of other jurisdictions’ interests in
enforcing their own antitrust laws”).
145. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 116, at 11 (comparing the
sanctions available in OECD countries). Most OECD countries provide the possibility of
heavy fines against corporations involved in a cartel, with maximum fines expressed as a
monetary amount, a percentage of turnover for a specified period of time, or both. Id. Less
than half of the OECD countries provide for sanctions against individuals participating in
unlawful cartel activity. Id. Only nine countries make cartel participation a criminal
offense. Id. The United States provides for all of the mentioned sanctions. Id. Fourteen
countries permit recovery through private antitrust actions, including the United States. Id.
at 11; see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Foreign Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts: Jurisdictional Conflicts
on Global Antitrust Enforcement, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 365, 373 (2004) (noting that
private treble damages is a uniquely American remedy, and most other regimes oppose the
availability of multiple damages awards altogether). But see Jones, supra note 103, at 425
(highlighting the EU’s allowing recovery equal to 150% of damages to illustrate that foreign
plaintiffs can recover in jurisdictions that award prejudgment interest even if those regimes
do not award treble damages).
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liberally as does the United States.146 In recognizing this growing concern,
the Supreme Court correctly sought to emphasize the need to limit the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws to achieve increased
harmonization of competition laws.147 Such harmonization will result in
greater cooperation among nations as a means to facilitate international
commerce,148 increase detection and deterrence of cartel formation,149 and
strengthen international relationships.150 This approach avoids interfering
with the ability of other sovereign nations to regulate anticompetitive
activities that affect their country but have little connection with the United
States.151
146. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 116, at 11-12 (analyzing
data to conclude that there is “substantial variation across countries” in the number of
prosecutions and the amount of sanctions applied in those prosecutions). In the period
between 1998 and 2002, the United States was among the countries that imposed the highest
amount of fines against corporations and individuals, and it was only joined by Canada in
sentencing individuals to prison terms. Id.
147. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163-64 (2004)
(stating that limited extraterritorial jurisdiction helps conflicting laws work together in a
highly interdependent commercial world).
148. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 116, at 2 (concluding that
cartels result in adverse effects to efficiency in a market economy). A cartel’s most notable
impact is that of raising prices above competitive levels and reducing output, which either
forces consumers to pay higher prices for products or forgo the product altogether. Id.
Another substantial effect of a cartel is that it shelters its members from market forces, so
there is a reduced pressure to control costs or innovate, both of which lead to market
stagnation and harm to the consumer. Id.
149. See Klein Speech, supra note 141, at 9 (urging further cooperation between
countries because “the conspirators are working globally, so antitrust enforcers must do so
as well”). The growing cooperation among nations has resulted in conspirators having
fewer safe havens where they will be shielded from enforcement. Id. at 10. As nations
strengthen their antitrust enforcement policies, formal and informal cooperation agreements
will be increasingly more efficient at detecting and deterring cartel formation. Id. at 11-12;
see Note, supra note 21, at 2144 (stating that the “widespread growth and potential
harmonization” of the laws of many nations “can and should fill the gaps in worldwide
antitrust protection”).
150. See Burnett, supra note 6, at 629-31 (indicating that bilateral and multilateral
treaties and cooperation between nations foster good relations among different countries and
lead to a greater exchange of information on corporations’ illegal activities). In 2001,
enforcement agencies of the United States and thirteen other jurisdictions, including the
European Union, joined to form the International Competition Network (ICN) to work
together toward the detection and deterrence of cartel organizations. Int’l Competition
Network, History, http://www.internation
alcompetitionnetwork.org/history.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2005). ICN membership has
now swelled to seventy-seven national or multinational competition agencies that enforce
antitrust laws. Int’l Competition Network, ICN Membership Contact List (Oct. 31, 2005),
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetw
ork.org/icn_membership_list.pdf.
151. See Burnett, supra note 6, at 629 (calling for courts to require “a nexus between the
actors, the transaction and the regulating State” to avoid unnecessary interference with the
regulatory schemes of foreign nations). Because investigations of global cartels frequently
require assistance of foreign countries in investigating illegal activities, cooperation between
countries achieves the goal of deterrence “without unduly contributing to international
friction.” Id. at 633-34. Thus, greater cooperation also reduces tension among nations that
view U.S. assertions of extraterritoriality as motivated by “pecuniary self-interest.” Id. at
631. To this effect, the United States has entered into formal bilateral agreements regarding
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C. Restricting Access to Federal Courts Will Weed Out Marginal Claims
Given that private actions make up the majority of antitrust claims heard
in federal court,152 requiring a showing of proximate causation should have
a positive impact on the use of judicial resources in handling antitrust
claims.153 The purpose of imposing the proximate cause standard is not to
keep all foreign claims out of U.S. courts.154 Instead, applying the standard
will merely weed out claims by private plaintiffs alleging foreign harms
that are no more than tangentially related to U.S. adverse domestic
effects.155 In this way, federal courts may succeed in avoiding “lengthier
proceedings, appeals, and more proceedings—to the point where
procedural costs and delays would themselves threaten interference with a
foreign nation’s ability to maintain the integrity of its own antitrust
enforcement system.”156
Some commentators have argued that courts have other avenues through
which they can weed out marginal cases, and therefore it is not necessary to
restrict the jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act in order to achieve this
result.157 For example, courts will dismiss cases where damages claims are
antitrust cooperation with Germany, Australia, and Canada. Id. at 631-32. The DOJ has
also established contracts to facilitate collection of evidence with Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Germany, the European Communities, Israel, Japan and Mexico. Id.
152. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT
OF
THE
DIRECTOR,
tbl.
C-2,
at
2
(2004),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html (tabulating the number of civil cases
commenced in U.S. District Courts by basis of jurisdiction and nature of suit during the
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2004). In 2004, there were 752 total antitrust
cases of which 731 were private actions (97.2%). Id.
153. See Buswell, supra note 7, at 997 (noting that “placing some limits on the numbers
of plaintiffs likely to raise a claim under the FTAIA alleviates expenses and burdens on the
court system”).
154. The FTAIA’s legislative history indicates that Congress intended courts to reach
only the activities of global cartels that have the requisite effects on domestic commerce:
“[a]ny major activities of an international cartel would likely have the requisite impact on
United States commerce to trigger United States subject matter jurisdiction.” H.R. REP. NO.
97-686, at 13 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2487, 2498.
155. See Buswell, supra note 7, at 997 (explaining that imposing restrictions on the
jurisdictional reach of U.S. antitrust laws “force[s] foreign plaintiffs to seek remedies in
their own countries”).
156. See F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 168-69 (2004)
(clarifying that the Court’s holding avoids “lengthier proceedings, appeals, and more
proceedings—to the point where procedural costs and delays would themselves threaten
interference with a foreign nation’s ability to maintain the integrity of its own antitrust
enforcement system”).
157. See, e.g., Sam Foster Halabi, Recent Development, The “Comity” of Empagran:
The Supreme Court Decides that Foreign Competition Regulation Limits American Antitrust
Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 279, 292 (2005) (arguing that
other jurisdictional considerations such as venue and personal jurisdiction would limit
access to U.S. courts); Köster & Wheeler, supra note 10, at 727 (asserting that “[o]ther legal
requirements, such as standing, personal jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens, will . . .
contribute to the filtering of marginal cases”); see also Bauer, supra note 9, at 323
(emphasizing the concern that plaintiffs bringing frivolous cases to federal courts is
addressed by “the willingness of judges to grant summary judgment” or impose sanctions).
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speculative,158 where venue is lacking,159 or where the doctrine of forum
non conveniens exempts foreign parties from U.S. laws.160 Courts may
also realize the potential gain for plaintiffs who seek treble damages and
consequently look favorably upon motions for summary judgment and
motions to dismiss.161 It is therefore possible that in some cases, courts
may establish, before significant discovery occurs and prior to a full trial,
whether plaintiffs have sufficiently established their case.162
One of the central advantages of adopting the proximate cause standard
is that it provides a framework for courts to make such determinations
more efficiently by clarifying the Supreme Court’s otherwise vague
independent effects test.163 Indeed, one of the impacts of requiring a
showing of proximate causation is that it may lead to a greater number of
dismissals following a challenge to the sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint164 because it provides a more determinative test for
158. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the
Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437, 450 (2001) (noting that
courts have justified dismissal of damages claims where damages are speculative or where it
is likely that the court would have to engage in complex calculations).
159. See Mehra, supra note 42, at 307 (acknowledging that reading the FTAIA broadly
may create a “burden of foreign parties on U.S. courts,” but suggesting that personal
jurisdiction and venue requirements may mitigate the consequences of expanding the
jurisdictional reach of the Sherman Act). One commentator has noted that the obstacles of
“service of process, venue, personal jurisdiction, motion practice, myriad discovery
disputes, creating a persuasive record at trial, surviving appellate review, and enforcing any
resulting judgment,” in cases involving foreign commerce “far exceed the question of
whether the United States courts have jurisdiction to prescribe anticompetitive conduct done
abroad by foreign nationals.” Waller, supra note 44, at 572.
160. See Michael G. McKinnon, Comment, Federal Judicial and Legislative Jurisdiction
over Entities Abroad: The Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law and Viable Solutions Beyond the
Timberlane/Restatement Comity Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1219, 1242 (1994) (explaining
that defendants in a case may use the doctrine of forum non conveniens to send the action to
a more appropriate forum). Although courts normally give greater deference to the
plaintiff’s choice of forum, this is not the case for foreign plaintiffs. See Piper Aircraft Co.
v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (emphasizing that the court will normally assume that
when the home forum is chosen, the forum is convenient; but “[w]hen the plaintiff is
foreign . . . this assumption is much less reasonable”).
161. See Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples
of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1104 (1986) (noting
that “disposal of antitrust cases prior to trial is encouraged”). In analyzing data concerning
the use of motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment, Calkins concluded that
“courts have adjusted to the treble damages remedy . . . by being relatively more willing to
keep cases from going to trial.” Id. at 1140.
162. See Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws: The
Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551, 584 (1991) (clarifying that in cases where
plaintiffs allege price-fixing conspiracies, “a plaintiff must establish that its injuries result
from those same price and output effects” and courts will dismiss the case if the plaintiff
cannot prove that conduct-nexus link).
163. See discussion supra Part I.A-B for an explanation of how the proximate cause
requirement accords with the Supreme Court’s majority opinion in Empagran and the
legislative histories of the Sherman Act and the FTAIA.
164. Challenges may be based either on 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of requisite
effects or on 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. AREEDA &
HOVEMKAMP, supra note 36, § 273c4 (Supp. 2005). While 12(b)(1) motions may require a
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jurisdiction.165 At least one court applied the D.C. Circuit’s proximate
cause test and dismissed the claim based on but-for causation after merely
one hearing on a hybrid “motion to dismiss the claims . . . for failure to
state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”166 This suggests
that the application of the proximate cause standard will be similar to “the
typical case involving subject matter jurisdiction” where any fact finding
under a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of requisite effects, if
necessary, 167 is “well-defined and do[es] not normally consume enormous
judicial resources.”168 An early challenge would allow courts to avoid
having to go through a factual analysis that may only reveal, at the end of
costly169 and time consuming litigation,170 that the case has no merit.171
It is far better to impose a more restricted jurisdictional test, such as the
proximate cause standard, that dissuades foreign plaintiffs from forum
shopping for a more lucrative remedy in the form of treble damages
whenever they have claims based on world-wide effects.172 More
court to look beyond the facts alleged in a complaint, the 12(b)(6) motion does not require
the judge to look beyond the complaint. Id. A divided Seventh Circuit indicated that
FTAIA claims should only be subject to 12(b)(1) motions, but other courts still allow
challenges based on 12(b)(6) motions. See, e.g., United Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Angus Chem.
Co., 322 F.3d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (supporting this holding on the notion that the
FTAIA is a jurisdictional statute and does not involve the substantive elements of the
claim); see also infra note 176 (providing an example of a court that allows both motions to
challenge an FTAIA claim).
165. Cf. AREEDA & HOVEMKAMP, supra note 36, § 273c4 (Supp. 2005) (noting that the
flaw in using a balancing test to determine jurisdiction is that it is “complex, fact-laden” and
“indeterminate” and may lead to substantial litigation before a dismissal on the grounds of
lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
166. See eMag Solutions L.L.C. v. Toda Kogyo Corp., No. C 02-1611 PJH, 2005 WL
1712084, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2005) (following the D.C. Circuit decision in Empagran
and dismissing a complaint relying on an alternate theory based on but-for causation where
four foreign plaintiffs brought suit against a Delaware company alleging that defendants
were part of a worldwide conspiracy to set the prices for a product used to manufacture such
things as audio and video tapes).
167. A defendant has two options in a 12(b)(1) challenge: it can make a facial challenge
contesting the sufficiency of the pleadings or a factual challenge of the facts alleged. See
AREEDA & HOVEMKAMP, supra note 36, § 273c4 (Supp. 2005) (explaining that in a facial
challenge the court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true whereas a factual challenge
“goes beyond the face of the complaint”). Thus, under 12(b)(1) standards, “the court is not
bound to accept the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but may look beyond the
complaint and the pleadings to evidence that calls the court’s jurisdiction into doubt.”
Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 205 F.3d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 2000).
168. United Phosphorous, Ltd., 322 F.3d at 957 (Wood, J., dissenting).
169. See POSNER, supra note 123, at 41 (cautioning that “enforcement resources
consumed in marginal cases are unavailable for more important ones”). See generally
Buswell, supra note 7, at 997 (emphasizing that the American taxpayer will have to fund
increased litigation).
170. See POSNER, supra note 123, at 232 (calculating that the typical antitrust case takes
two or three months and the trial record might run ten to fifteen thousand pages).
171. See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 162, at 584 (acknowledging that many cases are
dismissed later in litigation, sometimes only at the conclusion of trial, if plaintiffs fail to
“establish the facts on which their theories of antitrust injury are based”).
172. See Burnett, supra note 6, at 615 (warning that one repercussion of allowing the
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importantly, it will create a disincentive to so-called “competitor
plaintiffs,”173 which resort to using federal courts as a means to wear down
competitors and extract a settlement for marginal cases.174 In order to
guarantee a well-functioning judiciary system, it is crucial that lawsuits of
this nature be dismissed early in the litigation process.175 If foreign
plaintiffs are aware that U.S. courts will dismiss marginal claims at the
outset of litigation, they will calculate that the cost of filing a suit will
outweigh any expected benefit from a judgment.176 If the expected
judgment is zero because the court will likely dismiss the case, it follows
that a plaintiff’s willingness to bring the suit and incur litigation expenses
will be zero as well. By employing such a simple cost-benefit analysis
before filing such a claim to harm competitors, corporations should
conclude that such frivolous litigation will yield little, if any, benefit.177
CONCLUSION
As this Comment discusses, courts should follow the D.C. Circuit’s lead
in imposing proximate causation as the standard to determine whether a
foreign injury due to anticompetitive conduct is independent of U.S.
domestic effects. Although private antitrust actions are important to the
goal of deterring anticompetitive conduct, the interest in deterrence must be
counterbalanced with considerations of international comity and judicial
expansive extraterritorial application of U.S. laws is the increased potential for forum
shopping “as foreign litigants seek remedies unavailable under their local laws”). Foreign
plaintiffs may also be attracted to U.S. courts because they “provide broad discovery rules,
generous class actions, jury trials, and subsidized contingency fees.” Id. at 616.
173. These competitor plaintiffs may sue their rivals in order to prevent them from
merging or entering into contractual agreements, restrain aggressive pricing, or “merely to
burden [them] with litigation costs.” See Snyder & Kauper, supra note 162, at 551
(explaining that, although private actions may have a “prominent role” in antitrust
enforcement, they also may be used to subvert competition). At least one commentator has
raised the possibility that corporations may seek amnesty despite the potential civil liability
in order to benefit from inflicting criminal penalties and civil damages on co-conspirators,
who are most likely also competitors. See Mehra, supra note 117, at 54 (explaining that
corporations seeking amnesty will weigh the benefit of avoiding jail time against several
factors such as the potential profits to be gained from the cartel, the expected amount of
civil damages it may have to pay, the likelihood of detection, and its discount rate).
174. See Bauer, supra note 9, at 323 (commenting that bringing suits only to wear down
rivals is an extreme tactic, often recognized as such by judges). One of the main concerns in
this area of law is that private parties, unlike governments, are concerned solely with their
own enrichment and may file suits as a way to protect themselves from competitors. Id.
175. See POSNER, supra note 123, at 232 (characterizing the ordinary antitrust case as
“unmanageable” and as a “malignant growth[] on the judicial system”).
176. See id. at 228 (explaining that because the budgetary constraints on private
plaintiffs are low, they will bring any lawsuit where the expected judgment is greater than
the expected cost of litigation).
177. Cf. Snyder & Kauper, supra note 162, at 576-77 (noting that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)—a decision
that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish antitrust injuries—resulted in the
creation of “significant barrier[s] to actions brought by competitors”).
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efficiency.178 As discussed in this Comment, it is not in the best interest of
the United States to allow marginal claims to be litigated in U.S. federal
courts.179 By permitting foreign plaintiffs to have broad access to U.S.
federal courts, the United States, in effect, supplants the laws of other
nations, which is a result that Congress did not contemplate.180 A more
restrictive standard achieves the Supreme Court’s goal of ensuring that
foreign plaintiffs litigate their claims in their home courts instead of
bringing them in the United States.181 Forcing foreign plaintiffs with
marginal claims to seek redress in their home countries minimizes conflicts
with foreign nations, as it ensures greater harmonization of laws while
simultaneously fostering cooperation among nations which may lead to
worldwide deterrence of anticompetitive activity.

178. See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that legislative history and Supreme Court
decisions support the circuit court’s approach in placing comity considerations as the basis
for the imposition of the proximate cause standard).
179. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text (explaining that a more expansive
approach to the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts would lead to unnecessary interference
with the interest of foreign nations and would overburden the federal court system).
180. See discussion supra Part III.B (examining the text and legislative history of the
Sherman Act and the FTAIA to conclude that Congress did not intend to become the
world’s court).
181. See discussion supra Part III.C (discussing how a more restrictive approach can
weed out marginal claims and push foreign plaintiffs to seek redress in their home
jurisdiction).

